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31. Hence it is not enough to put one's
trust in the tethering of horses, and the burying
of chariot wheels in the ground
[These quaint devices to prevent one's army
from running away recall the Athenian hero
Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the
battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened
himself firmly to one spot. [See Herodotus, IX.
74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzu, to render
flight impossible by such mechanical means. You
will not succeed unless your men have tenacity and
unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of
sympathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which
can be learned from the SHUAI-JAN.]
32. The principle on which to manage an army
is to set up one standard of courage which all
must reach.
[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as
though [it were that of] one." If the ideal army
is to form a single organic whole, then it follows
that the resolution and spirit of its component
parts must be of the same quality, or at any rate
must not fall below a certain standard.
Wellington's seemingly ungrateful description of
his army at Waterloo as "the worst he had ever
commanded" meant no more than that it was
deficient in this important particular--unity of
spirit and courage. Had he not foreseen the
Belgian defections and carefully kept those troops
in the background, he would almost certainly have
lost the day.]
33. How to make the best of both strong and
weak--that is a question involving the proper use
of ground.
[Mei Yao-ch`en's paraphrase is: "The way to
eliminate the differences of strong and weak and
to make both serviceable is to utilize accidental
features of the ground." Less reliable troops, if
posted in strong positions, will hold out as long
as better troops on more exposed terrain. The
advantage of position neutralizes the inferiority
in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson says:
"With all respect to the text books, and to the
ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think
that the study of ground is often overlooked, and
that by no means sufficient importance is attached
to the selection of positions... and to the
immense advantages that are to be derived, whether
you are defending or attacking, from the proper
utilization of natural features." [2] ]
34. Thus the skillful general conducts his
army just as though he were leading a single man,
willy-nilly, by the hand.
[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to
the ease with which he does it."]
35. It is the business of a general to be
quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just,
and thus maintain order.
36. He must be able to mystify his officers
and men by false reports and appearances,
[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and
ears."]
and thus keep them in total ignorance.
[Ts`ao Kung gives us one of his excellent
apophthegms: "The troops must not be allowed to
share your schemes in the beginning; they may only
rejoice with you over their happy outcome." "To
mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy," is one
of the first principles in war, as had been
frequently pointed out. But how about the other
process--the mystification of one's own men?
Those who may think that Sun Tzu is over-emphatic
on this point would do well to read Col.
Henderson's remarks on Stonewall Jackson's Valley
campaign: "The infinite pains," he says, "with
which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his
most trusted staff officers, his movements, his
intentions, and his thoughts, a commander less
thorough would have pronounced useless"--etc.
etc. [3] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch.
47 of the HOU HAN SHU, "Pan Ch`ao took the field
with 25,000 men from Khotan and other Central
Asian states with the object of crushing Yarkand.
The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his
chief commander to succor the place with an army
drawn from the kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and
Wei-t`ou, totaling 50,000 men. Pan Ch`ao summoned
his officers and also the King of Khotan to a
council of war, and said: 'Our forces are now
outnumbered and unable to make head against the
enemy. The best plan, then, is for us to separate
and disperse, each in a different direction. The
King of Khotan will march away by the easterly
route, and I will then return myself towards the
west. Let us wait until the evening drum has
sounded and then start.' Pan Ch`ao now secretly
released the prisoners whom he had taken alive,
and the King of Kutcha was thus informed of his
plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set
off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar
Pan Ch`ao's retreat in the west, while the King of
Wen-su rode eastward with 8000 horse in order to
intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as Pan
Ch`ao knew that the two chieftains had gone, he
called his divisions together, got them well in
hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against the
army of Yarkand, as it lay encamped. The
barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, and
were closely pursued by Pan Ch`ao. Over 5000
heads were brought back as trophies, besides
immense spoils in the shape of horses and cattle
and valuables of every description. Yarkand then
capitulating, Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew
off their respective forces. From that time
forward, Pan Ch`ao's prestige completely overawed
the countries of the west." In this case, we see
that the Chinese general not only kept his own
officers in ignorance of his real plans, but
actually took the bold step of dividing his army
in order to deceive the enemy.]
37. By altering his arrangements and
changing his plans,
[Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using
the same stratagem twice.]
he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.
[Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work,
says: "The axiom, that war is based on deception,
does not apply only to deception of the enemy.
You must deceive even your own soldiers. Make
them follow you, but without letting them know
why."]
By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes,
he prevents the enemy from anticipating his
purpose.
38. At the critical moment, the leader of an
army acts like one who has climbed up a height and
then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries
his men deep into hostile territory before he
shows his hand.
[Literally, "releases the spring" (see V.
ss. 15), that is, takes some decisive step which
makes it impossible for the army to return--like
Hsiang Yu, who sunk his ships after crossing a
river. Ch`en Hao, followed by Chia Lin,
understands the words less well as "puts forth
every artifice at his command."]
39. He burns his boats and breaks his
cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of
sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and
nothing knows whither he is going.
[Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of
orders to advance or retreat; it is ignorant of
the ulterior ends of attacking and conquering."]
40. To muster his host and bring it into
danger:--this may be termed the business of the
general.
[Sun Tzu means that after mobilization there
should be no delay in aiming a blow at the enemy's
heart. Note how he returns again and again to
this point. Among the warring states of ancient
China, desertion was no doubt a much more present
fear and serious evil than it is in the armies of
today.]
41. The different measures suited to the
nine varieties of ground;
[Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound
in interpreting the rules for the nine varieties
of ground.]
the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics;
and the fundamental laws of human nature: these
are things that must most certainly be studied.
42. When invading hostile territory, the
general principle is, that penetrating deeply
brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means
dispersion.
[Cf. supra, ss. 20.]
43. When you leave your own country behind,
and take your army across neighborhood territory,
you find yourself on critical ground.
[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in
VIII. ss. 2, but it does not figure among the
Nine Situations or the Six Calamities in chap. X.
One's first impulse would be to translate it
distant ground," but this, if we can trust the
commentators, is precisely what is not meant here.
Mei Yao-ch`en says it is "a position not far
enough advanced to be called 'facile,' and not
near enough to home to be 'dispersive,' but
something between the two." Wang Hsi says: "It is
ground separated from home by an interjacent
state, whose territory we have had to cross in
order to reach it. Hence, it is incumbent on us
to settle our business there quickly." He adds
that this position is of rare occurrence, which is
the reason why it is not included among the Nine
Situations.]
When there are means of communication on all four
sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.
44. When you penetrate deeply into a
country, it is serious ground. When you penetrate
but a little way, it is facile ground.
45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on
your rear, and narrow passes in front, it is
hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of
refuge at all, it is desperate ground.
46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would
inspire my men with unity of purpose.
[This end, according to Tu Mu, is best
attained by remaining on the defensive, and
avoiding battle. Cf. supra, ss. 11.]
On facile ground, I would see that there is close
connection between all parts of my army.
[As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard
against two possible contingencies: "(1) the
desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden attack
on the part of the enemy." Cf. VII. ss. 17.
Mei Yao-ch`en says: "On the march, the regiments
should be in close touch; in an encampment, there
should be continuity between the fortifications."]
47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up
my rear.
[This is Ts`ao Kung's interpretation. Chang
Yu adopts it, saying: "We must quickly bring up
our rear, so that head and tail may both reach the
goal." That is, they must not be allowed to
straggle up a long way apart. Mei Yao-ch`en
offers another equally plausible explanation:
"Supposing the enemy has not yet reached the
coveted position, and we are behind him, we should
advance with all speed in order to dispute its
possession." Ch`en Hao, on the other hand,
assuming that the enemy has had time to select his
own ground, quotes VI. ss. 1, where Sun Tzu
warns us against coming exhausted to the attack.
His own idea of the situation is rather vaguely
expressed: "If there is a favorable position
lying in front of you, detach a picked body of
troops to occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on
their numbers, come up to make a fight for it, you
may fall quickly on their rear with your main
body, and victory will be assured." It was thus,
he adds, that Chao She beat the army of Ch`in.
(See p. 57.)]
48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant
eye on my defenses. On ground of intersecting
highways, I would consolidate my alliances.
49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure
a continuous stream of supplies.
[The commentators take this as referring to
forage and plunder, not, as one might expect, to
an unbroken communication with a home base.]
On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along
the road.
50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any
way of retreat.
[Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I
meant to defend the position, whereas my real
intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy's
lines." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "in order to make my
soldiers fight with desperation." Wang Hsi says,
"fearing lest my men be tempted to run away." Tu
Mu points out that this is the converse of VII.
ss. 36, where it is the enemy who is surrounded.
In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and
canonized as Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great
army under Erh- chu Chao and others. His own
force was comparatively small, consisting only of
2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot. The
lines of investment had not been drawn very
closely together, gaps being left at certain
points. But Kao Huan, instead of trying to
escape, actually made a shift to block all the
remaining outlets himself by driving into them a
number of oxen and donkeys roped together. As
soon as his officers and men saw that there was
nothing for it but to conquer or die, their
spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of
exaltation, and they charged with such desperate
ferocity that the opposing ranks broke and
crumbled under their onslaught.]
On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my
soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives.
Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and
impedimenta, throw away your stores and
provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your
cooking-stoves, and make it plain to your men that
they cannot survive, but must fight to the death."
Mei Yao-ch`en says: "The only chance of life lies
in giving up all hope of it." This concludes what
Sun Tzu has to say about "grounds" and the
"variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the
passages which bear on this important subject, we
cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and
unmethodical fashion in which it is treated. Sun
Tzu begins abruptly in VIII. ss. 2 to enumerate
"variations" before touching on "grounds" at all,
but only mentions five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9
of the subsequent list, and one that is not
included in it. A few varieties of ground are
dealt with in the earlier portion of chap. IX,
and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with
six variations of plan to match. None of these is
mentioned again, though the first is hardly to be
distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next
chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we come to the
Nine Grounds par excellence, immediately followed
by the variations. This takes us down to ss. 14.
In SS. 43-45, fresh definitions are provided for
nos. 5, 6, 2, 8 and 9 (in the order given), as
well as for the tenth ground noticed in chap.
VIII; and finally, the nine variations are
enumerated once more from beginning to end, all,
with the exception of 5, 6 and 7, being different
from those previously given. Though it is
impossible to account for the present state of Sun
Tzu's text, a few suggestive facts maybe brought
into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to
the title, should deal with nine variations,
whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally
short chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine
Grounds. Several of these are defined twice over,
besides which there are two distinct lists of the
corresponding variations. (4) The length of the
chapter is disproportionate, being double that of
any other except IX. I do not propose to draw any
inferences from these facts, beyond the general
conclusion that Sun Tzu's work cannot have come
down to us in the shape in which it left his
hands: chap. VIII is obviously defective and
probably out of place, while XI seems to contain
matter that has either been added by a later hand
or ought to appear elsewhere.]
51. For it is the soldier's disposition to
offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to
fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to
obey promptly when he has fallen into danger.
[Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan
Ch`ao's devoted followers in 73 A.D. The story
runs thus in the HOU HAN SHU, ch. 47: "When Pan
Ch`ao arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the
country, received him at first with great
politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his
behavior underwent a sudden change, and he became
remiss and negligent. Pan Ch`ao spoke about this
to the officers of his suite: 'Have you noticed,'
he said, 'that Kuang's polite intentions are on
the wane? This must signify that envoys have come
from the Northern barbarians, and that
consequently he is in a state of indecision, not
knowing with which side to throw in his lot. That
surely is the reason. The truly wise man, we are
told, can perceive things before they have come to
pass; how much more, then, those that are already
manifest!' Thereupon he called one of the natives
who had been assigned to his service, and set a
trap for him, saying: 'Where are those envoys
from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some day ago?' The
man was so taken aback that between surprise and
fear he presently blurted out the whole truth.
Pan Ch`ao, keeping his informant carefully under
lock and key, then summoned a general gathering of
his officers, thirty-six in all, and began
drinking with them. When the wine had mounted
into their heads a little, he tried to rouse their
spirit still further by addressing them thus:
'Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an
isolated region, anxious to achieve riches and
honor by some great exploit. Now it happens that
an ambassador from the Hsiung-no arrived in this
kingdom only a few days ago, and the result is
that the respectful courtesy extended towards us
by our royal host has disappeared. Should this
envoy prevail upon him to seize our party and hand
us over to the Hsiung-no, our bones will become
food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to
do?' With one accord, the officers replied:
'Standing as we do in peril of our lives, we will
follow our commander through life and death.' For
the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. ss.
1, note.]
52. We cannot enter into alliance with
neighboring princes until we are acquainted with
their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on
the march unless we are familiar with the face of
the country--its mountains and forests, its
pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.
We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to
account unless we make use of local guides.
[These three sentences are repeated from VII.
SS. 12-14 -- in order to emphasize their
importance, the commentators seem to think. I
prefer to regard them as interpolated here in
order to form an antecedent to the following
words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzu might
have added that there is always the risk of going
wrong, either through their treachery or some
misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13):
Hannibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead him
into the neighborhood of Casinum, where there was
an important pass to be occupied; but his
Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation
of Latin names, caused the guide to understand
Casilinum instead of Casinum, and turning from his
proper route, he took the army in that direction,
the mistake not being discovered until they had
almost arrived.]
53. To be ignored of any one of the
following four or five principles does not befit a
warlike prince.
54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful
state, his generalship shows itself in preventing
the concentration of the enemy's forces. He
overawes his opponents, and their allies are
prevented from joining against him.
[Mei Tao-ch`en constructs one of the chains
of reasoning that are so much affected by the
Chinese: "In attacking a powerful state, if you
can divide her forces, you will have a superiority
in strength; if you have a superiority in
strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you
overawe the enemy, the neighboring states will be
frightened; and if the neighboring states are
frightened, the enemy's allies will be prevented
from joining her." The following gives a stronger
meaning: "If the great state has once been
defeated (before she has had time to summon her
allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof
and refrain from massing their forces." Ch`en Hao
and Chang Yu take the sentence in quite another
way. The former says: "Powerful though a prince
may be, if he attacks a large state, he will be
unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to
some extent on external aid; if he dispenses with
this, and with overweening confidence in his own
strength, simply tries to intimidate the enemy, he
will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his view
thus: "If we recklessly attack a large state, our
own people will be discontented and hang back.
But if (as will then be the case) our display of
military force is inferior by half to that of the
enemy, the other chieftains will take fright and
refuse to join us."]
55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself
with all and sundry, nor does he foster the power
of other states. He carries out his own secret
designs, keeping his antagonists in awe.
[The train of thought, as said by Li Ch`uan,
appears to be this: Secure against a combination
of his enemies, "he can afford to reject
entangling alliances and simply pursue his own
secret designs, his prestige enable him to
dispense with external friendships."]
Thus he is able to capture their cities and
overthrow their kingdoms.
[This paragraph, though written many years
before the Ch`in State became a serious menace, is
not a bad summary of the policy by which the
famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for
her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yu,
following up his previous note, thinks that Sun
Tzu is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded
selfishness and haughty isolation.]
56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule,
[Wu Tzu (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let
advance be richly rewarded and retreat be heavily
punished."]
issue orders
[Literally, "hang" or post up."]
without regard to previous arrangements;
["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang
Hsi. The general meaning is made clear by Ts`ao
Kung's quotation from the SSU-MA FA: "Give
instructions only on sighting the enemy; give
rewards when you see deserving deeds." Ts`ao
Kung's paraphrase: "The final instructions you
give to your army should not correspond with those
that have been previously posted up." Chang Yu
simplifies this into "your arrangements should not
be divulged beforehand." And Chia Lin says:
"there should be no fixity in your rules and
arrangements." Not only is there danger in letting
your plans be known, but war often necessitates
the entire reversal of them at the last moment.]
and you will be able to handle a whole army as
though you had to do with but a single man.
[Cf. supra, ss. 34.]
57. Confront your soldiers with the deed
itself; never let them know your design.
[Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e.
do not give your reasons for any order. Lord
Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no
reasons" for his decisions, and the maxim is even
more applicable to a general than to a judge.]
When the outlook is bright, bring it before their
eyes; but tell them nothing when the situation is
gloomy.
58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it
will survive; plunge it into desperate straits,
and it will come off in safety.
[These words of Sun Tzu were once quoted by
Han Hsin in explanation of the tactics he employed
in one of his most brilliant battles, already
alluded to on p. 28. In 204 B.C., he was sent
against the army of Chao, and halted ten miles
from the mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the
enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at
midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light
cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a
red flag. Their instructions were to make their
way through narrow defiles and keep a secret watch
on the enemy. "When the men of Chao see me in
full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon
their fortifications and give chase. This must be
the sign for you to rush in, pluck down the Chao
standards and set up the red banners of Han in
their stead." Turning then to his other officers,
he remarked: "Our adversary holds a strong
position, and is not likely to come out and attack
us until he sees the standard and drums of the
commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back
and escape through the mountains." So saying, he
first of all sent out a division consisting of
10,000 men, and ordered them to form in line of
battle with their backs to the River Ti. Seeing
this maneuver, the whole army of Chao broke into
loud laughter. By this time it was broad
daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the
generalissimo's flag, marched out of the pass with
drums beating, and was immediately engaged by the
enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some
time; until at length Han Hsin and his colleague
Chang Ni, leaving drums and banner on the field,
fled to the division on the river bank, where
another fierce battle was raging. The enemy
rushed out to pursue them and to secure the
trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but
the two generals succeeded in joining the other
army, which was fighting with the utmost
desperation. The time had now come for the 2000
horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw
the men of Chao following up their advantage, they
galloped behind the deserted walls, tore up the
enemy's flags and replaced them by those of Han.
When the Chao army looked back from the pursuit,
the sight of these red flags struck them with
terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in and
overpowered their king, they broke up in wild
disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the
panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on
them from both sides and completed the rout,
killing a number and capturing the rest, amongst
whom was King Ya himself.... After the battle,
some of Han Hsin's officers came to him and said:
"In the ART OF WAR we are told to have a hill or
tumulus on the right rear, and a river or marsh on
the left front. [This appears to be a blend of
Sun Tzu and T`ai Kung. See IX ss. 9, and note.]
You, on the contrary, ordered us to draw up our
troops with the river at our back. Under these
conditions, how did you manage to gain the
victory?" The general replied: "I fear you
gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with
sufficient care. Is it not written there:
'Plunge your army into desperate straits and it
will come off in safety; place it in deadly peril
and it will survive'? Had I taken the usual
course, I should never have been able to bring my
colleague round. What says the Military
Classic--'Swoop down on the market-place and drive
the men off to fight.' [This passage does not
occur in the present text of Sun Tzu.] If I had
not placed my troops in a position where they were
obliged to fight for their lives, but had allowed
each man to follow his own discretion, there would
have been a general debandade, and it would have
been impossible to do anything with them." The
officers admitted the force of his argument, and
said: "These are higher tactics than we should
have been capable of." [See CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch.
34, ff. 4, 5.] ]
59. For it is precisely when a force has
fallen into harm's way that is capable of striking
a blow for victory.
[Danger has a bracing effect.]
60. Success in warfare is gained by
carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy's
purpose.
[Ts`ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"--by an
appearance of yielding and falling in with the
enemy's wishes. Chang Yu's note makes the meaning
clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to
advance, lure him on to do so; if he is anxious to
retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out
his intention." The object is to make him remiss
and contemptuous before we deliver our attack.]
61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's
flank,
[I understand the first four words to mean
"accompanying the enemy in one direction." Ts`ao
Kung says: "unite the soldiers and make for the
enemy." But such a violent displacement of
characters is quite indefensible.]
we shall succeed in the long run
[Literally, "after a thousand LI."]
in killing the commander-in-chief.
[Always a great point with the Chinese.]
62. This is called ability to accomplish a
thing by sheer cunning.
63. On the day that you take up your
command, block the frontier passes, destroy the
official tallies,
[These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one
half of which was issued as a permit or passport
by the official in charge of a gate. Cf. the
"border-warden" of LUN YU III. 24, who may have
had similar duties. When this half was returned
to him, within a fixed period, he was authorized
to open the gate and let the traveler through.]
and stop the passage of all emissaries.
[Either to or from the enemy's country.]
64. Be stern in the council-chamber,
[Show no weakness, and insist on your plans
being ratified by the sovereign.]
so that you may control the situation.
[Mei Yao-ch`en understands the whole sentence
to mean: Take the strictest precautions to ensure
secrecy in your deliberations.]
65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you
must rush in.
66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what
he holds dear,
[Cf. supra, ss. 18.]
and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the
ground.
[Ch`en Hao`s explanation: "If I manage to
seize a favorable position, but the enemy does not
appear on the scene, the advantage thus obtained
cannot be turned to any practical account. He who
intends therefore, to occupy a position of
importance to the enemy, must begin by making an
artful appointment, so to speak, with his
antagonist, and cajole him into going there as
well." Mei Yao-ch`en explains that this "artful
appointment" is to be made through the medium of
the enemy's own spies, who will carry back just
the amount of information that we choose to give
them. Then, having cunningly disclosed our
intentions, "we must manage, though starting after
the enemy, to arrive before him (VII. ss. 4).
We must start after him in order to ensure his
marching thither; we must arrive before him in
order to capture the place without trouble. Taken
thus, the present passage lends some support to
Mei Yao-ch`en's interpretation of ss. 47.]
67. Walk in the path defined by rule,
[Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing
that matters, and this cannot be achieved by
adhering to conventional canons." It is
unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight
authority, for the sense yielded is certainly much
more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know,
according to the veterans of the old school whom
he defeated, won his battles by violating every
accepted canon of warfare.]
and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you
can fight a decisive battle.
[Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy's tactics
until a favorable opportunity offers; then come
forth and engage in a battle that shall prove
decisive."]
68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a
maiden, until the enemy gives you an opening;
afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare,
and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose
you.
[As the hare is noted for its extreme
timidity, the comparison hardly appears
felicitous. But of course Sun Tzu was thinking
only of its speed. The words have been taken to
mean: You must flee from the enemy as quickly as
an escaping hare; but this is rightly rejected by
Tu Mu.]
[1] Giles' Biographical Dictionary, no. 399.
[2] "The Science of War," p. 333.
[3] "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421.
---------------------------------------
XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE
[Rather more than half the chapter (SS.
1-13) is devoted to the subject of fire, after
which the author branches off into other topics.]
1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of
attacking with fire. The first is to burn
soldiers in their camp;
[So Tu Mu. Li Ch`uan says: "Set fire to the
camp, and kill the soldiers" (when they try to
escape from the flames). Pan Ch`ao, sent on a
diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see
XI. ss. 51, note], found himself placed in
extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an
envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of
the Chinese]. In consultation with his officers,
he exclaimed: "Never venture, never win! [1] The
only course open to us now is to make an assault
by fire on the barbarians under cover of night,
when they will not be able to discern our numbers.
Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate
them completely; this will cool the King's courage
and cover us with glory, besides ensuring the
success of our mission.' the officers all replied
that it would be necessary to discuss the matter
first with the Intendant. Pan Ch`ao then fell
into a passion: 'It is today,' he cried, 'that
our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is
only a humdrum civilian, who on hearing of our
project will certainly be afraid, and everything
will be brought to light. An inglorious death is
no worthy fate for valiant warriors.' All then
agreed to do as he wished. Accordingly, as soon
as night came on, he and his little band quickly
made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong
gale was blowing at the time. Pan Ch`ao ordered
ten of the party to take drums and hide behind the
enemy's barracks, it being arranged that when they
saw flames shoot up, they should begin drumming
and yelling with all their might. The rest of his
men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in
ambuscade at the gate of the camp. He then set
fire to the place from the windward side,
whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting
arose on the front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who
rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder. Pan
Ch`ao slew three of them with his own hand, while
his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and
thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a
hundred in all, perished in the flames. On the
following day, Pan Ch`ao, divining his thoughts,
said with uplifted hand: 'Although you did not go
with us last night, I should not think, Sir, of
taking sole credit for our exploit.' This
satisfied Kuo Hsun, and Pan Ch`ao, having sent for
Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the head of
the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized
with fear and trembling, which Pan Ch`ao took
steps to allay by issuing a public proclamation.
Then, taking the king's sons as hostage, he
returned to make his report to Tou Ku." HOU HAN
SHU, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ]
the second is to burn stores;
[Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder."
In order to subdue the rebellious population of
Kiangnan, Kao Keng recommended Wen Ti of the Sui
dynasty to make periodical raids and burn their
stores of grain, a policy which in the long run
proved entirely successful.]
the third is to burn baggage trains;
[An example given is the destruction of Yuan
Shao`s wagons and impedimenta by Ts`ao Ts`ao in
200 A.D.]
the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines;
[Tu Mu says that the things contained in
"arsenals" and "magazines" are the same. He
specifies weapons and other implements, bullion
and clothing. Cf. VII. ss. 11.]
the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the
enemy.
[Tu Yu says in the T`UNG TIEN: "To drop fire
into the enemy's camp. The method by which this
may be done is to set the tips of arrows alight by
dipping them into a brazier, and then shoot them
from powerful crossbows into the enemy's lines."]
2. In order to carry out an attack, we must
have means available.
[T`sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the
enemy's camp" are referred to. But Ch`en Hao is
more likely to be right in saying: "We must have
favorable circumstances in general, not merely
traitors to help us." Chia Lin says: "We must
avail ourselves of wind and dry weather."]
the material for raising fire should always be
kept in readiness.
[Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire:
"dry vegetable matter, reeds, brushwood, straw,
grease, oil, etc." Here we have the material
cause. Chang Yu says: "vessels for hoarding
fire, stuff for lighting fires."]
3. There is a proper season for making
attacks with fire, and special days for starting a
conflagration.
4. The proper season is when the weather is
very dry; the special days are those when the moon
is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall,
the Wing or the Cross-bar;
[These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th,
27th, and 28th of the Twenty-eight Stellar
Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius,
Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.]
for these four are all days of rising wind.
5. In attacking with fire, one should be
prepared to meet five possible developments:
6. (1) When fire breaks out inside to
enemy's camp, respond at once with an attack from
without.
7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but
the enemy's soldiers remain quiet, bide your time
and do not attack.
[The prime object of attacking with fire is
to throw the enemy into confusion. If this effect
is not produced, it means that the enemy is ready
to receive us. Hence the necessity for caution.]
8. (3) When the force of the flames has
reached its height, follow it up with an attack,
if that is practicable; if not, stay where you
are.
[Ts`ao Kung says: "If you see a possible
way, advance; but if you find the difficulties too
great, retire."]
9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault
with fire from without, do not wait for it to
break out within, but deliver your attack at a
favorable moment.
[Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had
reference to the fire breaking out (either
accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of
incendiaries) inside the enemy's camp. "But," he
continues, "if the enemy is settled in a waste
place littered with quantities of grass, or if he
has pitched his camp in a position which can be
burnt out, we must carry our fire against him at
any seasonable opportunity, and not await on in
hopes of an outbreak occurring within, for fear
our opponents should themselves burn up the
surrounding vegetation, and thus render our own
attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling once
baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way.
The latter, taking advantage of a favorable wind,
tried to set fire to the Chinese general's camp,
but found that every scrap of combustible
vegetation in the neighborhood had already been
burnt down. On the other hand, Po-ts`ai, a
general of the Yellow Turban rebels, was badly
defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect of this
simple precaution. "At the head of a large army
he was besieging Ch`ang-she, which was held by
Huang-fu Sung. The garrison was very small, and a
general feeling of nervousness pervaded the ranks;
so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and
said: "In war, there are various indirect methods
of attack, and numbers do not count for
everything. [The commentator here quotes Sun Tzu,
V. SS. 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched
their camp in the midst of thick grass which will
easily burn when the wind blows. If we set fire
to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic,
and we can make a sortie and attack them on all
sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of
T`ien Tan.' [See p. 90.] That same evening, a
strong breeze sprang up; so Huang-fu Sung
instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together
into torches and mount guard on the city walls,
after which he sent out a band of daring men, who
stealthily made their way through the lines and
started the fire with loud shouts and yells.
Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the
city walls, and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums,
led a rapid charge, which threw the rebels into
confusion and put them to headlong flight." [HOU
HAN SHU, ch. 71.] ]
10. (5) When you start a fire, be to
windward of it. Do not attack from the leeward.
[Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you
make a fire, the enemy will retreat away from it;
if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he
will fight desperately, which will not conduce to
your success." A rather more obvious explanation
is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in the east,
begin burning to the east of the enemy, and follow
up the attack yourself from that side. If you
start the fire on the east side, and then attack
from the west, you will suffer in the same way as
your enemy."]
11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts
long, but a night breeze soon falls.
[Cf. Lao Tzu's saying: "A violent wind does
not last the space of a morning." (TAO TE CHING,
chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch`en and Wang Hsi say: "A
day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night
breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as a
general rule." The phenomenon observed may be
correct enough, but how this sense is to be
obtained is not apparent.]
12. In every army, the five developments
connected with fire must be known, the movements
of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the
proper days.
[Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as
to the paths of the stars, and watch for the days
on which wind will rise, before making our attack
with fire." Chang Yu seems to interpret the text
differently: "We must not only know how to assail
our opponents with fire, but also be on our guard
against similar attacks from them."]
13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to
the attack show intelligence; those who use water
as an aid to the attack gain an accession of
strength.
14. By means of water, an enemy may be
intercepted, but not robbed of all his belongings.
[Ts`ao Kung's note is: "We can merely
obstruct the enemy's road or divide his army, but
not sweep away all his accumulated stores." Water
can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible
destructive power of fire. This is the reason,
Chang Yu concludes, why the former is dismissed in
a couple of sentences, whereas the attack by fire
is discussed in detail. Wu Tzu (ch. 4) speaks
thus of the two elements: "If an army is encamped
on low-lying marshy ground, from which the water
cannot run off, and where the rainfall is heavy,
it may be submerged by a flood. If an army is
encamped in wild marsh lands thickly overgrown
with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent
gales, it may be exterminated by fire."]
15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to
win his battles and succeed in his attacks without
cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the
result is waste of time and general stagnation.
[This is one of the most perplexing passages
in Sun Tzu. Ts`ao Kung says: "Rewards for good
service should not be deferred a single day." And
Tu Mu: "If you do not take opportunity to advance
and reward the deserving, your subordinates will
not carry out your commands, and disaster will
ensue." For several reasons, however, and in spite
of the formidable array of scholars on the other
side, I prefer the interpretation suggested by Mei
Yao-ch`en alone, whose words I will quote: "Those
who want to make sure of succeeding in their
battles and assaults must seize the favorable
moments when they come and not shrink on occasion
from heroic measures: that is to say, they must
resort to such means of attack of fire, water and
the like. What they must not do, and what will
prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold to
the advantages they have got."]
16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler
lays his plans well ahead; the good general
cultivates his resources.
[Tu Mu quotes the following from the SAN
LUEH, ch. 2: "The warlike prince controls his
soldiers by his authority, kits them together by
good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable.
If faith decays, there will be disruption; if
rewards are deficient, commands will not be
respected."]
17. Move not unless you see an advantage;
use not your troops unless there is something to
be gained; fight not unless the position is
critical.
[Sun Tzu may at times appear to be
over-cautious, but he never goes so far in that
direction as the remarkable passage in the TAO TE
CHING, ch. 69. "I dare not take the initiative,
but prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not
advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."]
18. No ruler should put troops into the
field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general
should fight a battle simply out of pique.
19. If it is to your advantage, make a
forward move; if not, stay where you are.
[This is repeated from XI. ss. 17. Here I
feel convinced that it is an interpolation, for it
is evident that ss. 20 ought to follow
immediately on ss. 18.]
20. Anger may in time change to gladness;
vexation may be succeeded by content.
21. But a kingdom that has once been
destroyed can never come again into being;
[The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy
example of this saying.]
nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.
22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful,
and the good general full of caution. This is the
way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.
[1] "Unless you enter the tiger's lair, you cannot
get hold of the tiger's cubs."
---------------------------------------
XIII. THE USE OF SPIES
1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a
hundred thousand men and marching them great
distances entails heavy loss on the people and a
drain on the resources of the State. The daily
expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of
silver.
[Cf. II. ss. ss. 1, 13, 14.]
There will be commotion at home and abroad, and
men will drop down exhausted on the highways.
[Cf. TAO TE CHING, ch. 30: "Where troops
have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring
up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be reminded
of the saying: 'On serious ground, gather in
plunder.' Why then should carriage and
transportation cause exhaustion on the
highways?--The answer is, that not victuals alone,
but all sorts of munitions of war have to be
conveyed to the army. Besides, the injunction to
'forage on the enemy' only means that when an army
is deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity
of food must be provided against. Hence, without
being solely dependent on the enemy for corn, we
must forage in order that there may be an
uninterrupted flow of supplies. Then, again,
there are places like salt deserts where
provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home
cannot be dispensed with."]
As many as seven hundred thousand families will be
impeded in their labor.
[Mei Yao-ch`en says: "Men will be lacking at
the plough- tail." The allusion is to the system
of dividing land into nine parts, each consisting
of about 15 acres, the plot in the center being
cultivated on behalf of the State by the tenants
of the other eight. It was here also, so Tu Mu
tells us, that their cottages were built and a
well sunk, to be used by all in common. [See II.
ss. 12, note.] In time of war, one of the
families had to serve in the army, while the other
seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy
of 100,000 men (reckoning one able- bodied soldier
to each family) the husbandry of 700,000 families
would be affected.]
2. Hostile armies may face each other for
years, striving for the victory which is decided
in a single day. This being so, to remain in
ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because
one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of
silver in honors and emoluments,
["For spies" is of course the meaning, though
it would spoil the effect of this curiously
elaborate exordium if spies were actually
mentioned at this point.]
is the height of inhumanity.
[Sun Tzu's agreement is certainly ingenious.
He begins by adverting to the frightful misery and
vast expenditure of blood and treasure which war
always brings in its train. Now, unless you are
kept informed of the enemy's condition, and are
ready to strike at the right moment, a war may
drag on for years. The only way to get this
information is to employ spies, and it is
impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they
are properly paid for their services. But it is
surely false economy to grudge a comparatively
trifling amount for this purpose, when every day
that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater
sum. This grievous burden falls on the shoulders
of the poor, and hence Sun Tzu concludes that to
neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a
crime against humanity.]
3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no
present help to his sovereign, no master of
victory.
[This idea, that the true object of war is
peace, has its root in the national temperament of
the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., these
memorable words were uttered by Prince Chuang of
the Ch`u State: "The [Chinese] character for
'prowess' is made up of [the characters for] 'to
stay' and 'a spear' (cessation of hostilities).
Military prowess is seen in the repression of
cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the
preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the
firm establishment of merit, the bestowal of
happiness on the people, putting harmony between
the princes, the diffusion of wealth."]
4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and
the good general to strike and conquer, and
achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men,
is FOREKNOWLEDGE.
[That is, knowledge of the enemy's
dispositions, and what he means to do.]
5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited
from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively
from experience,
[Tu Mu's note is: "[knowledge of the enemy]
cannot be gained by reasoning from other analogous
cases."]
nor by any deductive calculation.
[Li Ch`uan says: "Quantities like length,
breadth, distance and magnitude, are susceptible
of exact mathematical determination; human actions
cannot be so calculated."]
6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can
only be obtained from other men.
[Mei Yao-ch`en has rather an interesting
note: "Knowledge of the spirit-world is to be
obtained by divination; information in natural
science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the
laws of the universe can be verified by
mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of
an enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies
alone."]
7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are
five classes: (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies;
(3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5)
surviving spies.
8. When these five kinds of spy are all at
work, none can discover the secret system. This
is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It
is the sovereign's most precious faculty.
[Cromwell, one of the greatest and most
practical of all cavalry leaders, had officers
styled 'scout masters,' whose business it was to
collect all possible information regarding the
enemy, through scouts and spies, etc., and much of
his success in war was traceable to the previous
knowledge of the enemy's moves thus gained." [1] ]
9. Having LOCAL SPIES means employing the
services of the inhabitants of a district.
[Tu Mu says: "In the enemy's country, win
people over by kind treatment, and use them as
spies."]
10. Having INWARD SPIES, making use of
officials of the enemy.
[Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as
likely to do good service in this respect:
"Worthy men who have been degraded from office,
criminals who have undergone punishment; also,
favorite concubines who are greedy for gold, men
who are aggrieved at being in subordinate
positions, or who have been passed over in the
distribution of posts, others who are anxious that
their side should be defeated in order that they
may have a chance of displaying their ability and
talents, fickle turncoats who always want to have
a foot in each boat. Officials of these several
kinds," he continues, "should be secretly
approached and bound to one's interests by means
of rich presents. In this way you will be able to
find out the state of affairs in the enemy's
country, ascertain the plans that are being formed
against you, and moreover disturb the harmony and
create a breach between the sovereign and his
ministers." The necessity for extreme caution,
however, in dealing with "inward spies," appears
from an historical incident related by Ho Shih:
"Lo Shang, Governor of I-Chou, sent his general
Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of Shu in his
stronghold at P`i. After each side had
experienced a number of victories and defeats, Li
Hsiung had recourse to the services of a certain
P`o-t`ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to have him
whipped until the blood came, and then sent him
off to Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by offering
to cooperate with him from inside the city, and to
give a fire signal at the right moment for making
a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these
promises, march out all his best troops, and
placed Wei Po and others at their head with orders
to attack at P`o-t`ai's bidding. Meanwhile, Li
Hsiung's general, Li Hsiang, had prepared an
ambuscade on their line of march; and P`o-t`ai,
having reared long scaling-ladders against the
city walls, now lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po's
men raced up on seeing the signal and began
climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while
others were drawn up by ropes lowered from above.
More than a hundred of Lo Shang's soldiers entered
the city in this way, every one of whom was
forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with
all his forces, both inside and outside the city,
and routed the enemy completely." [This happened
in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho Shih got the
story from. It is not given in the biography of
Li Hsiung or that of his father Li T`e, CHIN SHU,
ch. 120, 121.]
11. Having CONVERTED SPIES, getting hold of
the enemy's spies and using them for our own
purposes.
[By means of heavy bribes and liberal
promises detaching them from the enemy's service,
and inducing them to carry back false information
as well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen.
On the other hand, Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we
pretend not to have detected him, but contrive to
let him carry away a false impression of what is
going on. Several of the commentators accept this
as an alternative definition; but that it is not
what Sun Tzu meant is conclusively proved by his
subsequent remarks about treating the converted
spy generously (ss. 21 sqq.). Ho Shih notes
three occasions on which converted spies were used
with conspicuous success: (1) by T`ien Tan in his
defense of Chi-mo (see supra, p. 90); (2) by Chao
She on his march to O-yu (see p. 57); and by the
wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien P`o was
conducting a defensive campaign against Ch`in.
The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien
P`o's cautious and dilatory methods, which had
been unable to avert a series of minor disasters,
and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of
his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy
and were already in Fan Chu's pay. They said:
"The only thing which causes Ch`in anxiety is lest
Chao Kua should be made general. Lien P`o they
consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be
vanquished in the long run." Now this Chao Kua was
a sun of the famous Chao She. From his boyhood,
he had been wholly engrossed in the study of war
and military matters, until at last he came to
believe that there was no commander in the whole
Empire who could stand against him. His father
was much disquieted by this overweening conceit,
and the flippancy with which he spoke of such a
serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that
if ever Kua was appointed general, he would bring
ruin on the armies of Chao. This was the man who,
in spite of earnest protests from his own mother
and the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now
sent to succeed Lien P`o. Needless to say, he
proved no match for the redoubtable Po Ch`i and
the great military power of Ch`in. He fell into a
trap by which his army was divided into two and
his communications cut; and after a desperate
resistance lasting 46 days, during which the
famished soldiers devoured one another, he was
himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force,
amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly
put to the sword.]
12. Having DOOMED SPIES, doing certain
things openly for purposes of deception, and
allowing our spies to know of them and report them
to the enemy.
[Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the
meaning: "We ostentatiously do thing calculated
to deceive our own spies, who must be led to
believe that they have been unwittingly disclosed.
Then, when these spies are captured in the enemy's
lines, they will make an entirely false report,
and the enemy will take measures accordingly, only
to find that we do something quite different. The
spies will thereupon be put to death." As an
example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the
prisoners released by Pan Ch`ao in his campaign
against Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also refers to
T`ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T`ai
Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into
fancied security, until Li Ching was able to
deliver a crushing blow against him. Chang Yu
says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing
T`ang Chien, but this is a mistake, for we read in
both the old and the New T`ang History (ch. 58,
fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he
escaped and lived on until 656. Li I-chi played a
somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when sent by
the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations with
Ch`i. He has certainly more claim to be described
a "doomed spy", for the king of Ch`i, being
subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin,
and infuriated by what he considered the treachery
of Li I-chi, ordered the unfortunate envoy to be
boiled alive.]
13. SURVIVING SPIES, finally, are those who
bring back news from the enemy's camp.
[This is the ordinary class of spies,
properly so called, forming a regular part of the
army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a
man of keen intellect, though in outward
appearance a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a
will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed
with physical strength and courage; thoroughly
accustomed to all sorts of dirty work, able to
endure hunger and cold, and to put up with shame
and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the following story
of Ta`hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: "When he was
governor of Eastern Ch`in, Shen-wu of Ch`i made a
hostile movement upon Sha-yuan. The Emperor T`ai
Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the
enemy. He was accompanied by two other men. All
three were on horseback and wore the enemy's
uniform. When it was dark, they dismounted a few
hundred feet away from the enemy's camp and
stealthily crept up to listen, until they
succeeded in catching the passwords used in the
army. Then they got on their horses again and
boldly passed through the camp under the guise of
night-watchmen; and more than once, happening to
come across a soldier who was committing some
breach of discipline, they actually stopped to
give the culprit a sound cudgeling! Thus they
managed to return with the fullest possible
information about the enemy's dispositions, and
received warm commendation from the Emperor, who
in consequence of their report was able to inflict
a severe defeat on his adversary."]
14. Hence it is that which none in the whole
army are more intimate relations to be maintained
than with spies.
[Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en point out that the
spy is privileged to enter even the general's
private sleeping-tent.]
None should be more liberally rewarded. In no
other business should greater secrecy be
preserved.
[Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all
communication with spies should be carried
"mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may
be quoted from Turenne, who made perhaps larger
use of them than any previous commander: "Spies
are attached to those who give them most, he who
pays them ill is never served. They should never
be known to anybody; nor should they know one
another. When they propose anything very
material, secure their persons, or have in your
possession their wives and children as hostages
for their fidelity. Never communicate anything to
them but what is absolutely necessary that they
should know. [2] ]
15. Spies cannot be usefully employed
without a certain intuitive sagacity.
[Mei Yao-ch`en says: "In order to use them,
one must know fact from falsehood, and be able to
discriminate between honesty and double-dealing."
Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more
along the lines of "intuitive perception" and
"practical intelligence." Tu Mu strangely refers
these attributes to the spies themselves: "Before
using spies we must assure ourselves as to their
integrity of character and the extent of their
experience and skill." But he continues: "A
brazen face and a crafty disposition are more
dangerous than mountains or rivers; it takes a man
of genius to penetrate such." So that we are left
in some doubt as to his real opinion on the
passage."]
16. They cannot be properly managed without
benevolence and straightforwardness.
[Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted
them by substantial offers, you must treat them
with absolute sincerity; then they will work for
you with all their might."]
17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one
cannot make certain of the truth of their reports.
[Mei Yao-ch`en says: "Be on your guard
against the possibility of spies going over to the
service of the enemy."]
18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your
spies for every kind of business.
[Cf. VI. ss. 9.]
19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by
a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to
death together with the man to whom the secret was
told.
[Word for word, the translation here is: "If
spy matters are heard before [our plans] are
carried out," etc. Sun Tzu's main point in this
passage is: Whereas you kill the spy himself "as
a punishment for letting out the secret," the
object of killing the other man is only, as Ch`en
Hao puts it, "to stop his mouth" and prevent news
leaking any further. If it had already been
repeated to others, this object would not be
gained. Either way, Sun Tzu lays himself open to
the charge of inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to
defend him by saying that the man deserves to be
put to death, for the spy would certainly not have
told the secret unless the other had been at pains
to worm it out of him."]
20. Whether the object be to crush an army,
to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual,
it is always necessary to begin by finding out the
names of the attendants, the aides-de- camp,
[Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu
Yu says, to "those whose duty it is to keep the
general supplied with information," which
naturally necessitates frequent interviews with
him.]
and door-keepers and sentries of the general in
command. Our spies must be commissioned to
ascertain these.
[As the first step, no doubt towards finding
out if any of these important functionaries can be
won over by bribery.]
21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy
on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led
away and comfortably housed. Thus they will
become converted spies and available for our
service.
22. It is through the information brought by
the converted spy that we are able to acquire and
employ local and inward spies.
[Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the
enemy's spies we learn the enemy's condition." And
Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the converted spy
into our service, because it is he that knows
which of the local inhabitants are greedy of gain,
and which of the officials are open to
corruption."]
23. It is owing to his information, again,
that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false
tidings to the enemy.
[Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy
knows how the enemy can best be deceived."]
24. Lastly, it is by his information that
the surviving spy can be used on appointed
occasions.
25. The end and aim of spying in all its
five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this
knowledge can only be derived, in the first
instance, from the converted spy.
[As explained in ss. 22-24. He not only
brings information himself, but makes it possible
to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.]
Hence it is essential that the converted spy be
treated with the utmost liberality.
26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty
[Sun Tzu means the Shang dynasty, founded in
1766 B.C. Its name was changed to Yin by P`an
Keng in 1401.
was due to I Chih
[Better known as I Yin, the famous general
and statesman who took part in Ch`eng T`ang's
campaign against Chieh Kuei.]
who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise
of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya
[Lu Shang rose to high office under the
tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he afterwards helped to
overthrow. Popularly known as T`ai Kung, a title
bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have
composed a treatise on war, erroneously identified
with the LIU T`AO.]
who had served under the Yin.
[There is less precision in the Chinese than
I have thought it well to introduce into my
translation, and the commentaries on the passage
are by no means explicit. But, having regard to
the context, we can hardly doubt that Sun Tzu is
holding up I Chih and Lu Ya as illustrious
examples of the converted spy, or something
closely analogous. His suggestion is, that the
Hsia and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the
intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and
shortcoming which these former ministers were able
to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch`en
appears to resent any such aspersion on these
historic names: "I Yin and Lu Ya," he says, "were
not rebels against the Government. Hsia could not
employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin
could not employ the latter, hence Hou employed
him. Their great achievements were all for the
good of the people." Ho Shih is also indignant:
"How should two divinely inspired men such as I
and Lu have acted as common spies? Sun Tzu's
mention of them simply means that the proper use
of the five classes of spies is a matter which
requires men of the highest mental caliber like I
and Lu, whose wisdom and capacity qualified them
for the task. The above words only emphasize this
point." Ho Shih believes then that the two heroes
are mentioned on account of their supposed skill
in the use of spies. But this is very weak.]
27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler
and the wise general who will use the highest
intelligence of the army for purposes of spying
and thereby they achieve great results.
[Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just
as water, which carries a boat from bank to bank,
may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance
on spies, while production of great results, is
oft-times the cause of utter destruction."]
Spies are a most important element in water,
because on them depends an army's ability to move.
[Chia Lin says that an army without spies is
like a man with ears or eyes.]
[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 2.
[2] "Marshal Turenne," p. 311.
